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An Honest Drug Offender Sentencing Letter 
 
 
Lucius T. Outlaw III* 
 
To the Honorable United States District Court Judge of District Anywhere 
USA: 
Both of us are very familiar with this point in a case.  My client has pled guilty 
to a drug trafficking crime.  You have accepted the plea.  The presentence report is 
done and in your hands.  The mathematics of the sentencing guidelines is complete.  
The prosecutor has provided a vivid account of my client’s criminal conduct and his 
criminal history to justify the sentence she has recommended. 
You turn to me. 
Now is my opportunity to ask for leniency—to explain why you should impose 
a sentence that is below what is advised by the federal sentencing guidelines and 
requested by the prosecutor.  In other words, it is time for me to beg. 
Typically, my begging consists of humanizing my client.  This involves talking 
about a life that is all too often marked by absent or neglectful parents, a family 
history of drug and alcohol abuse that my client inherited and extended, an 
abandoned formal education, and often an incident of violence or sexual abuse that 
profoundly affected my client at an early age.  More times than not, it involves 
explaining that drug dealing is a family or neighborhood legacy.  It involves talking 
about my client’s children and how the cycle of dysfunction and criminality will 
continue if their father or mother is incarcerated during the children’s formative 
years.  It involves a straining attempt to distinguish my client’s criminal acts from 
that of other drug defendants that you hear about every day.  I will provide a 
passionate yet pained effort to convince you that society need not fear my client. 
You take it all in.  You ask me few questions.  Then it is time for you to protect 
your sentence against a future appeal.  You use words such as discretion, deterrence, 
and community.  You explain the process of sentencing and cite the right case law. 
You express sympathy for my client’s dreadful childhood.  You make it clear to 
those who will read the transcript in future days that you have considered all that 
you are legally required and allowed, including what was said during the sentencing 
hearing up to this point. 
And then the moment comes—you hand down your sentence.  My client goes 
limp with hopelessness.  His family falls into a deep pool of shock and sorrow.  And 
with a “good luck” from you, it is over.  I have a few moments to offer some hope 
to my dumbfounded client as he is whisked away by the marshals.  Then I am left 
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trying to offer his family an explanation that provides some understanding and 
solace. 
I know that this is the system—the way it is done.  And I believe that the 
American criminal justice system is a model for the world.  But it is not without its 
faults.  And one of the faults is that sentencing is steadily becoming performance 
theater rather than a probing exercise of dispensing punishment and justice, 
particularly when it comes to drug offenses. 
Before I point the finger anywhere else, I must point it at myself.  I am a 
knowing, willing, and contributing cast member.  I know that when a defendant is 
poor, black, or brown (or white and poor) the system offers few favors and the 
outcome is largely predetermined.  Yet despite knowing this (or maybe in spite of 
knowing), I stand in front of you and beg that you spare months and years of my 
client’s freedom.  Unfortunately, my plea contains a few fictions.  You and I both 
know it. 
 
I. MY FICTION #1: THE DRUG-DEALING LIFE WAS UNAVOIDABLE FOR MY CLIENT 
 
The tragedy and despair that was my client’s childhood and formative years is 
heartbreaking and undeniable.  Equally devastating is his community continually 
reinforcing the belief that drug-dealing provides the greatest (if not only) 
opportunity for economic and social advancement for those trapped within it. 
Notwithstanding this reality, my attempt to characterize my client’s 
participation in “the game” as unavoidable is a blatant attempt to hide in plain view 
the choice he made.  No one can deny or discount that my client’s demoralizing 
childhood in a community of negative reinforcement limited his opportunities and 
pushed him to the narcotics trade.  However, it is equally undeniable that at some 
point in time he had an opportunity of choice—even if it was the slightest of 
moments and everything around him reinforced that dealing drugs was his only 
choice.  There are hundreds of people in his community who have lived through 
similar despair and have faced the same forces.  Yet, they made another choice—a 
choice away from the narcotics trade.  They balanced the near-certain death and 
prison time accompanying “the game” against the fleeting riches that come with it, 
and chose a different path. 
 
II. MY FICTION #2: IN ACCEPTING RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIS CRIMINAL CONDUCT, 
MY CLIENT UNDERSTANDS THAT HIS ACTIONS WERE WRONG (AND NOT JUST 
UNLAWFUL) 
 
The system rewards a defendant who accepts responsibility for his criminal 
activity and expresses remorse.1  The reward includes a reduction in prison exposure 
 
1   See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018) 
(reduces a defendant’s guidelines offense level by up to three levels if the defendant “demonstrates 
acceptance of responsibility for his offense” and pleads guilty in a timely manner). 
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under the sentencing guidelines and added benefits while a defendant serves his 
prison term. 
To be sure, my client is sorry for the pain and hardship that his arrest and 
incarceration will cause his family.  He is sorry that he will be separated from his 
family, particularly his children.  He is sorry that he is being stripped of his freedom 
for a specified time. 
But most of all, he is sorry that he was caught. 
Any moral remorse my client feels is outweighed by his anger at the system 
using its full might to incarcerate him.  It is trumped by his anger toward the cops 
who have harassed him for years, and who have lied to secure warrants, an arrest, 
and ultimately his conviction.  It is drowned by his rage toward the cooperator who 
put him in the crosshairs of the police and federal agents for a reward of money or a 
lesser sentence.  It is clouded by the shock of the mandatory minimum sentence he 
faces.  It is pushed aside by his dismay that the system will punish him if he exercises 
his constitutional right to a trial and loses.  It is blunted by the chorus of cell buddies, 
jailhouse lawyers, family members, and friends who are continuously telling him 
that he can beat the charge, or that a better plea deal is out there for the taking, and 
that his predicament is not his fault.  And any remorse he does feel is drowned by 
his despair, frustration, and anger at the institutional and societal forces that lock out 
the economic and educational opportunities that you take for granted from reaching 
his community. 
He also knows, however, that his anger will get him nowhere with you, and so 
he must temporarily bury it.  He understands that an expression of remorse and 
responsibility is necessary to fulfill your need to believe that you are making an 
impact on his life, and that the sentence you impose has meaning beyond just 
punishment.  He understands your need to feel that you are a part of his redemption 
and rebirth, just as much as you are society’s instrument for retribution and 
punishment.  He understands that if he provides you with that feeling, then you will 
lessen the federal boot on his neck ever so slightly. 
 
III. MY FICTION #3: MY CLIENT’S GUILTY PLEA WAS FREE OF COERCION 
 
When my client stood before you to formally enter his guilty plea under the 
terms of the plea agreement, you asked him (as required by law) whether he was 
doing so voluntarily and free of coercion.2  He responded that he was, and I seconded 
his answer.  Nothing could be further from the truth. 
Today, coercion is a hallmark of plea negotiations, particularly in drug cases.  
The coercion largely comes through the “trial tax”3 a prosecutor threatens to impose 
 
2   See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2). 
3   Trial tax is the increased punishment over the plea offer a defendant receives (or expects to 
receive) for rejecting a plea offer, insisting on a trial, and losing at trial.  See generally Brian D. Johnson, 
Trials and Tribulations: The Trial Tax and the Process of Punishment, 48 CRIME & JUST. 313, 313 
(2019). 
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if a defendant does not accept a plea deal whose terms are largely dictated by the 
government.  Today, refusing a plea offer and going to trial can lead a defendant to 
serve a sentence that is, on average, three times longer than if he had accepted the 
government’s plea deal.4 
There is very little a prosecutor cannot do, or threaten to do, in order to increase 
the trial tax and thereby increase the coercion of a defendant.5  They regularly file 
or threaten to file additional charges, particularly ones carrying mandatory minimum 
penalties, to increase the trial tax by years, even decades.6  They can set pressure-
inducing limits on how much time my client has to contemplate a plea offer.7  They 
are even allowed to (and do) threaten to charge my client’s family and loved ones if 
he does not accept the plea offer.8 
Plea bargaining is an accepted, useful, and beneficial tool of our criminal justice 
system.  It increases efficiency, saves resources, narrows cases, and clarifies the 
positions of the government and the defendant.  It has long been recognized that plea 
bargaining rests on the principle that “you don’t get something for nothing.”  Both 
sides understand that there is exchange at work—less time (for the defendant) for 
less work (for the government).  Today, however, prosecutors’ charging power has 
shifted the balance of this exchange so far that it is no longer an exercise in 
bargaining, but rather coercion. 
Despite the will-breaking coercion my client experienced, he and I know that 
he has to lie and say that his decision to plead guilty and accept the government’s 
plea deal was completely voluntary.  To tell the truth—that he pled guilty because 
the government threatened to impose a heavy trial tax on him or his loved ones if he 
exercised his constitutional right to a trial—would not save him from those threats 




4   Id.; see also NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, THE TRIAL PENALTY: THE SIXTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO TRIAL ON THE VERGE OF EXTINCTION AND HOW TO SAVE IT 17–20 (2018) 
(finding that in 2015 defendants who were convicted at trial received prison sentences that were on 
average three times longer than defendants who pled guilty—10.8 years compared to 3.3 years). 
5   See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751 (1970) (setting the line that prosecutors cross 
into impermissible coercion only when they employ “actual or threatened physical harm or . . . mental 
coercion overbearing the will of the defendant.”). 
6   See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (finding that the prosecutor did not 
commit prosecutorial misconduct by threatening during plea negotiations to seek a subsequent 
indictment under recidivist statute if the defendant chose not to plead guilty). 
7   See, e.g., Kelly v. United States, No. 6:09-cv-Orl-19KRS, 2010 WL 2991577, at *8 (M.D. 
Fla. July 27, 2010) (holding it was permissible for a prosecutor to set a 24-hour time limit for accepting 
a plea offer). 
8   See, e.g., United States v. Seng Chen Young, 926 F.3d 582, 591 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Every 
federal court of appeal to consider the issue . . . has held that plea agreements that condition leniency 
for third parties on the defendant’s guilty plea are permissible so long as the Government acted in ‘good 
faith,’ meaning that it had probable cause to prosecute the third party.”). 
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IV. MY FICTION #4: I AM MAKING A LARGE AND SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE 
 
My presence and involvement is constitutionally required.9  To achieve the 
promise of the Sixth Amendment, I zealously advocate for my client and hold the 
government to its obligations and burdens without compromise.  I bring all the 
thunder and fury I can muster to push back on the government’s allegations, to 
challenge the claims by the prosecutor, cooperators, and law enforcement officers 
working together against my client, and to appeal to you.  Yet through it all, I know 
that I am but a speed bump on the conveyer belt of inevitability.  That at the end of 
the day, despite all my dedicated advocacy, my client is headed to prison, likely 
longer than he deserves, and there is nothing I can do about it or the collateral 
consequences that will follow for him and his family. 
Yes, there are days when I achieve a “pure” win for my client—a case 
dismissal, a not guilty verdict, or even a no-prison time sentence. But those days are 
few and far between.  Other days will yield “public defender victories” such as 
persuading a judge to impose a term of imprisonment shorter than what was sought 
by the government.  Most days, however, I am rendered largely powerless against 
the mandatory minimum penalties, sentencing guidelines, conspiracy law, and other 
tools available to the prosecution that favor imprisoning my client for long stretches 
of time.  I have become a constitutionally-mandated cog in the machine of our 
judicial system with very little power to influence or disrupt it. 
Those are my fictions.  But I am not alone in this.  Your black robe does not 
insulate you from the fictions you perpetuate. 
 
V. YOUR FICTION #1: JUDICIAL DISCRETION REIGNS 
 
Nearly every sentencing hearing involves the judge commenting about how 
sentencing was changed forever by the Supreme Court case that returned sentencing 
power back to judges by declaring the federal sentencing guidelines advisory and no 
longer mandatory.10  My client (and his family) is left with the impression that his 
fate rests with your authority and ability to fashion a sentence that is tailored to the 
specific circumstances of his case and my client without being caged by the 
guidelines.  But the truth is that even though the Supreme Court opened the cage 
door, prosecutorial discretion and mandatory minimum penalties keep the opening 
ever so slight in drug cases, and impede and prevent you from fully exercising your 
discretion. 
As you are keenly aware, the explosion of offenses carrying mandatory 
minimum penalties has shifted a considerable amount of sentencing power from you 
to prosecutors.  In 1991, there were 98 federal criminal statutes that carried a 
 
9   U.S. CONST. amend. VI.; see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that 
the Sixth Amendment requires states to provide attorneys to criminal defendants who cannot afford 
their own attorneys). 
10  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
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mandatory minimum sentence.11  By 2011, that number nearly doubled to 195 
statutes.12  With the war on drugs, most of the expansion is connected to drug 
offenses.  Today, drug trafficking offenses account for approximately two-thirds of 
the offenses carrying a mandatory minimum penalty.13 
Prosecutors are using the unchecked power of mandatory minimums to tie your 
hands well before you ever see my client and similarly situated drug defendants.  For 
example, out of the 18,964 federal drug trafficking defendants sentenced in fiscal 
year 2018, 58.4% were convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory minimum 
sentence.14  This is a rate decline (some would say improvement) from the start of 
the decade where 66.1% of the 23,963 federal drug offenders sentenced in fiscal year 
2010 were convicted of a mandatory minimum offense.15 
Prosecutors cherish and embrace the power provided by mandatory minimums.  
After conducting a survey of federal prosecutors and defense attorneys in 13 judicial 
districts, the Sentencing Commission concluded that the “ability to charge an offense 
carrying a mandatory minimum penalty appears to be a threshold consideration in 
determining whether to exercise federal jurisdiction over certain types of criminal 
cases.”16  The surveyed defense attorneys, in particular, “concurred with the overall 
view that prosecutors charge an offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty if 
available.”17  And once such an offense is charged, federal prosecutors are 
steadfastly disinclined to dismiss a count carrying a mandatory minimum.18  In short, 
if there is an opportunity to cut you out of the sentencing process by tying your hands 
with an offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty, prosecutors will take it. 
In your hearts, you and your fellow judges resent this profound shift in power.  
One of your brethren who has been on the bench since 1979 recently put it best and 
bluntly: “The most sacred quality that judges guard most is discretion, which is [a] 
choice. . . . Mandatory minimums take that choice away . . . .”19  This is all to say 
that by the time my client’s case gets to you for sentencing, his fate is largely sealed.  
 
11  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, QUICK FACTS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES 1 (2011). 
12  Id. 
13  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 11 (2017). 
14  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, QUICK FACTS: DRUG TRAFFICKING OFFENSES 1 (2019). 
15  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN 
THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 153 (2011). 
16  Id. at 107. 
17  Id. 
18  See Id. at 108. 
19  Lori Atherton, Federal Judge, Former U.S. Attorney Discuss Mandatory Minimum Sentences 
at Michigan Law, U. MICH. L. (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.law.umich.edu/newsandinfo/features/
Pages/Federal-Judge-Former-U.S.-Attorney-Discuss-Mandatory-Minimum-Sentences-at-Michigan-
Law_112618.aspx (quoting Judge Avern Cohn of the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Michigan) (internal quotations omitted). 
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Your “discretion” is dictated, controlled, and limited by federal prosecutors wielding 
the unyielding might of mandatory minimums. 
 
VI. YOUR FICTION #2: ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE TO MY CLIENT ARE ONES YOU 
WOULD CHOOSE FOR YOURSELF (OR YOUR CHILDREN) 
 
As admitted earlier, my client exercised his freedom of choice by choosing to 
distribute drugs.  But that is not the end of the story or the analysis, because a 
person’s freedom of choice is only as valuable as the choices available to that person.  
And the truth is that the alternatives (to drug dealing) available to my client are ones 
that you would never freely choose for yourself, and certainly not for your children.  
Like many drug defendants that have stood before you, the alternatives available to 
my client were limited—staying in a school that you would not (and do not) send 
your children to attend, and/or working low-paying jobs that barely allow him to 
support himself and his family (if at all).  The reasons for this are numerous and 
complex, but they certainly include his school system that was unequipped and 
incapable of educating him.  It also certainly includes the poverty of his community 
that has closed off all but a few opportunities for lawful employment, which more 
times than not, do not provide sufficient earnings to change the circumstances of my 
client and his family.  It certainly includes the historic collaboration between the 
government and the real estate industry to use redlining and other tactics to keep our 
cities racially segregated (with the black and brown confined to the least desirable 
neighborhoods), and hamper people of color from enjoying the upward 
socioeconomic mobility that accompanies homeownership.20  No one comes out of 
the womb wanting and choosing to be a drug dealer knowing that the end result is 
likely death or imprisonment.  So, while my client had a choice, it was a choice 
among alternatives that no person, particularly you, would ever want for himself or 
his children. 
 
VII. YOUR FICTION #3: A FEDERAL PRISON OFFERS MY CLIENT AN OPPORTUNITY 
TO GAIN THE EDUCATION AND SKILLS HE NEEDS TO PURSUE A NONCRIMINAL 
LIFE WHEN HE IS RELEASED 
 
By the government’s own measure, federal prisons are failing to prepare 
inmates for a noncriminal life outside of their walls.  The most recent comprehensive 
Department of Justice audit of reentry programs offered by Bureau of Prison 
(“BOP”) facilities found that “31 to 69 percent of institutions . . . failed to meet their 
occupational, General Educational Development (GED), English-as-a-Second 
 
20  See generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR 
GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017); Ta-Nehisi Coats, The Case for Reparations, THE 
ATLANTIC (June 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-
reparations/361631/. 
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Language (ESL), Adult Continuing Education (ACE), or parenting goals.”21  
Moreover, in the face of this high failure rate, the auditors discovered that “the BOP 
did not have a mechanism in place to hold institutions accountable for meeting 
goals,” and the “institutions were not required to develop or implement corrective 
actions plans to remedy performance and ensure that goals [were] met in the 
future.”22  In other words, the BOP is failing miserably to meet the reentry 
preparedness goals that it set, and then is turning a blind eye to the failure. 
In terms of education and skills, the odds are that my client will emerge from 
federal prison the same as when he went in.  He will be released into the same 
community in which he lived prior to his time in federal custody—the same 
community that lacks sufficient legitimate opportunities outside of “hustling” for 
my client to support himself and his family.  Yet, you still believe (or rather hope) 
that a federal prison will provide my client with the means to instigate change, 
despite the clear evidence that BOP offers little that will equip my client to change 
his path in life. 
 
VIII. YOUR FICTION #4: DRUG LAWS—PARTICULARLY MANDATORY 
MINIMUMS—ARE NOT RACIST 
 
I am not saying that the members of Congress who drafted and passed drug 
mandatory minimums and other drug sentencing laws are racist.  Nor am I saying 
that federal judges or federal prosecutors are racist.  What I am saying is that many 
drug sentencing laws are having a measurable racially disproportionate effect on 
who is prosecuted and the sentences imposed on the convicted, and as more time 
passes the racial impact cannot be divorced from the laws themselves. 
When it comes to drug mandatory minimums, the numbers show that blacks 
are sentenced to mandatory minimum penalties at a higher rate than whites even 
though both racial groups are convicted for drug offenses at a similar rate, and blacks 
constitute 13.4% of the total population.23  Of the 23,964 federal drug offenders 
sentenced in fiscal year 2010, 26.2% were white and 27.3% were black.24  Yet, of 
the subset group of 15,831 offenders who were convicted of an offense carrying a 
mandatory minimum penalty, 30.3% were black compared to the 23.1% who were 
white.25  The disproportion widened once these offenders reached sentencing.  Of 
 
21  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT DIV., AUDIT REPORT 04-16, 
THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS INMATE RELEASE PREPARATION AND TRANSITIONAL REENTRY 
PROGRAMS, at iv (2004). 
22  Id. 
23  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUICK FACTS, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/
US/PST045219 (last visited Apr. 17, 2020) (as of July 1, 2018, whites constituted 76.5% and blacks 
constituted 13.4% of the U.S. population). 
24  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN 
THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, Table 8-1, at 154 (2011). 
25  Id. 
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the 7,212 drug offenders who remained subject to a mandatory minimum penalty at 
sentencing, 40.4% were black compared to 18.4% who were white.26  This 
disproportion has narrowed in recent years, but it still exists.27  Of course, there are 
many factors that contribute to the disproportion, but race is a factor that cannot be 
ignored or eliminated. 
Indeed, the infamous crack-powder cocaine mandatory minimum disparity 
makes it clear that race plays a role in the disproportionate effect of our drug laws.  
It appears race neutral that, on its face, 21 U.S.C § 841’s five-year mandatory 
minimum penalty is triggered by 500 grams of powder cocaine compared to just 28 
grams of crack cocaine, and its ten-year mandatory minimum penalty is triggered by 
5,000 grams of powder cocaine compared to 280 grams of crack.28  But the racial 
and socioeconomic realities of who generally uses and sells crack versus powder 
cocaine is well reflected by the statistic that 80% of those convicted for crack 
cocaine offenses in fiscal year 2018 were black.29  And once charged, blacks are 
subjected to the harsh mandatory minimum penalties for crack at an increased rate 
compared to whites charged with trafficking powder cocaine.  For instance, in fiscal 
year 2010, 1,966 black offenders were subject to a mandatory minimum sentence 
for crack, compared to the 194 white offenders who were subject to the powder 
cocaine mandatory minimum penalties.30  As one of your fellow federal judges 
succinctly put it, the crack-powder sentencing policy has resulted in a “racial 
disparity [that] is more extreme, more state-sponsored, and more entrenched than 
any racial disparity said to exist before the guidelines were enacted.”31 
There is no justification for the 18-1 disparity.  Chemically, crack is the same 
as powder cocaine, and therefore causes the same physiological and psychotropic 
effects as powder cocaine.32  Moreover, all the justifications cited for the disparity 
(even wider at that point) when the disparity was first enacted into law—e.g. crack 
 
26  Id. 
27  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES FOR DRUG OFFENSES IN 
THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2017) (Of the 19,584 federal drug offenders sentenced in 
fiscal year 2016, 23.4% were white, 23.5% were black.  Of the subset group of 8,760 offenders who 
were convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory minimum, 23.6% were black compared to the 21.9% 
who were white.  Of the 4,241 offenders who remained subject to a mandatory minimum penalty at 
sentencing, 31.4% were black compared to 23% who were white). 
28  21 U.S.C. § 841 (2018). 
29  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, QUICK FACTS: CRACK COCAINE TRAFFICKING OFFENSES 1 (2019). 
30  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN 
THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, Table 8-4, at 154, Table 8-7 at 192 (2011) (for that same 
fiscal year, 110 white offenders remained subject to a mandatory minimum for a crack offense, and 
556 black offenders remained subject to a mandatory minimum for a powder cocaine offense). 
31  Jed S. Rakoff, Why the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Should Be Scrapped, 28 CRIM. JUST. 
26, 29 (2014). 
32  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING 
POLICY (1995). 
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is more addictive—have long been debunked.33  That the disparity continues to exist 
despite you (and your fellow judges), prosecutors, and Congress knowing that it is 
unjustified and contributing to the growing racial disparity of our prison population, 
is why I say such laws are racist. 
You and I see every day what the data reflects—the growing racial 
disproportionality in this country’s prison population.34  We are witnessing from 
front row seats how harsh drug sentencing laws and enforcement policies are causing 
generations of black and brown Americans (mostly men) to be lost in 
disproportionate numbers to mass incarceration and locked into second-class 
citizenship as convicted felons. 
 
IX. YOUR FICTION #5: FEEL FREE TO EXERCISE YOUR RIGHT TO A TRIAL 
 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a federal drug defendant a jury trial if he so 
chooses.  Every drug offense defendant still has the right to trial by a jury of his 
peers.  What has changed is the cost of exercising that right—and by cost, I mean 
years in prison, and not legal fees.  It is a reality that cannot be sugar-coated: federal 
drug defendants are being coercively priced out of their Sixth Amendment trial right 
by the prosecutorial power supplied by mandatory minimum penalties and the 
federal sentencing guidelines. 
Prosecutors are using their unchecked power to stack the costs of losing a trial 
at coercively high levels.  Prosecutors present offenders with a simple choice: plead 
guilty and receive a sentence that is harsh, but allows you to walk free one day, or 
go to trial and spend your life (or most of it) in prison if you lose.  As discussed 
earlier, the trial tax is the added prison time that a defendant is exposed to for 
exercising his Sixth Amendment trial right.  It is a choice and a tax that people 
charged with federal offenses face daily, and the result for those who choose to 
exercise their trial right is sobering.  In 2012, the average post-trial sentence of a 
federal drug offender was three times higher than an offender who pled guilty: 
sixteen years versus five years and four months.35  Even first time drug offenders 
are not spared.  First timers (with no weapon involved in the offense) who faced a 
mandatory minimum sentence and chose to go to trial received sentences twice as 
long as similarly situated first-timers who accepted a plea: 117.6 months versus 59.5 
months.36  This wide gap, reflecting the expensive trial tax that accompanies drug 
 
33  See Deborah J. Vagins & Jesselyn McCurdy, Cracks in the System: Twenty Years of the 
Unjust Federal Crack Cocaine Law, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, at 4–5 (2006), https://www.aclu.org/
other/cracks-system-20-years-unjust-federal-crack-cocaine-law. 
34  See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Every 25 Seconds: The Human Toll of Criminalizing Drug 
Use in the United States, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, at 2 (2016), https://www.hrw.org/news/
2016/10/12/us-disastrous-toll-criminalizing-drug-use. 
35  An Offer You Can’t Refuse: How US Federal Prosecutors Force Drug Defendants to Plead 
Guilty, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2013), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/
us1213_ForUpload_0_0_0.pdf. 
36  Id. at 7–8. 
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cases involving mandatory minimums, has driven the extinction of trials in drug 
cases.  From the early 1980s—prior to the adoption of Section 841’s mandatory 
minimum scheme—to 2012, the percentage of federal drug cases being resolved by 
guilty pleas instead of trials jumped from 68.6% to 96.9%.37  The costs of using a 
trial to hold the government to its burden of proof has become too expensive by 
decades of prison time. 
 
X. YOUR FICTION #6: YOU ARE WINNING THE WAR ON DRUGS 
 
Mass incarceration is both a backbone tactic and a goal of the war on drugs.  
The generals of this war continually believe that the supply, as well as the demand, 
of drugs can be stymied by “tough on crime” sentencing policies, such as harsh 
mandatory minimum sentences and the elimination of parole for federal offenders.  
These policies drafted you into the war.  Now when you put on your black robe, you 
are putting on the uniform of a war-on-drugs soldier.  Cops and agents may staff the 
front lines, but you are responsible for housing, managing, and punishing the enemy 
combatants they capture. 
And you keep playing your role as a dutiful solider despite indicators that your 
side is losing—and losing badly.  Between 1980 and 2013, the number of 
incarcerated federal drug defendants increased by 2,006%, from 4,749 inmates to 
100,026 inmates.38  Today, 45.2% (74,222 people) of the federal prison population 
were convicted of a drug offense.39  By comparison, the second largest offense 
population today consists of people convicted of weapons, explosives, and arson 
related offenses—a distant 19% (31,299 people).40  Yet, despite the government’s 
ability to capture enemy combatants at this staggering rate, the continuous decline 
in the price of heroin and cocaine, along with the increasing purity of these drugs, 
shows that the war’s supply-side attack strategy has had little effect on the 
availability or purity of illegal drugs.41  Nor has the war led to a significant decrease 
in drug use by Americans. 
The inability to affect the supply of drugs is understandable considering that 
the war’s “success” is largely limited to imprisoning lower and middle level drug 
offenders—i.e. drug offenders who have minimal to no control over large-scale and 
large-volume manufacturing, importation, and distribution of narcotics.  Take for 
instance, people convicted of crack-related offenses.  In 2016, street-level dealers 
accounted for 45% of crack defendants that year, followed by wholesalers who 
 
37  Id. at 31. 
38  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 35, at 17. 
39   FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, INMATE STATISTICS: OFFENSES, https://www.bop.gov/about/
statistics/statistics_inmate_offenses.jsp (last updated Feb. 20, 2020). 
40  Id. 
41  See Katie Hunt, Report: Cheaper, Purer Illegal Substances Suggest Global War on Drugs is 
Failing, CNN (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/01/world/war-on-drugs-failing/. 
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constituted a distant 25.1%.42  Organizational leaders represented just 6.5% of crack 
defendants that year.43  The low rate that your war captures and imprisons those at 
or near the top of the illegal drug trafficking operations is not limited to crack.  
Overall, the most common functions of convicted federal drug defendants in recent 
years were courier (23%), followed by wholesaler (21.2%) and street-level dealer 
(17.2%).44 
Putting aside the lack of “success,” the war is also bankrupting your side.  More 
specifically, the cost of incarcerating drug offenders is consuming a crippling 
amount of resources and threatening the government’s ability to fight other types of 
crime and terrorism.  For starters, the federal system is arresting, convicting, and 
sentencing people to extended prison terms at a rate that surpasses the system’s 
capacity to house the convicted.  System-wide, at the end of 2017, BOP was 
operating at 14% over capacity.45  For high security facilities, the problem was worse 
at 24% over capacity.46 
The packing and overpacking of our prisons come with burdensome economic 
costs that are increasingly co-opting the Department of Justice’s resources. From 
fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2013, pretrial detention costs more than doubled from 
$617 million to $1.5 billion.47  Over that same time period, the BOP’s budget for 
incarcerating sentenced offenders became a dramatically increased amount of the 
DOJ’s budget: from 20% ($4.3 billion) of the Justice Department’s FY 2001 
discretionary budget to 25% ($6.4 billion) of its FY 2013 budget.48  It is not hard to 
see how the housing, feeding, caring for, and providing rehabilitative services to a 
rapidly growing prison population has become burdensomely expensive.  Medical 
care costs alone have become crippling.  The price tag for providing medical care to 
all federal inmates reached $1.18 billion for fiscal year 2017.49  Medical costs will 
only increase as the growing prison population ages.  As the BOP recently warned 
Congress, the agency’s “medical care costs are growing at an unsustainable rate.”50  
The growth in “unsustainable” costs is not contained to medical care.  Indeed, as a 
deputy attorney general told the American Bar Association, “the ‘unsustainable’ cost 
of the prison system represents ‘a crisis that . . . has the potential to swallow up so 
 
42  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES FOR DRUG OFFENSES IN 
THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 115 (2017). 
43  Id. 
44  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 35, at 18. 
45  DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, FY 2019 PERFORMANCE BUDGET 11 (2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/jmd/page/file/1034421/download. 
46  Id. 
47  Memorandum from Dep’t of Justice Inspector Gen. Michael Horowitz to Dep’t of Justice 
Attorney Gen. (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/oig/challenges/2013.htm [hereinafter Inspector 
General Memorandum]. 
48  Id. 
49  FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, supra note 45, at 19. 
50  Id. at 23. 
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many important efforts in the fight against crime,’ and that ‘[e]very dollar we spend 
at the [DOJ] on prisons and detention . . . is a dollar we are not spending on law 
enforcement efforts aimed at violent crime, drug cartels, public corruption cases, 
financial fraud cases, human trafficking cases, [and] child exploitation . . . .’” 51 
Finally, if there ever was a clear sign of the failure of the war on drugs, it is the 
growing number of states that are decriminalizing and legalizing marijuana 
possession and sale.  These states have not only abandoned the war, but instead seek 
to manage and profit from of the war’s primary targets. 
So here we are—both exposed.  We tell ourselves that these fictions serve a 
broader purpose, but really we are just not ready to do without them.  The fictions 
make it easier for us to get through this case and on to the next—because there is 
always a next case.  If we were to forsake the fictions, we would be forced to 
confront the hard truths about why more than 2.2 million people are incarcerated in 
this country, and 6.6 million are under the supervision of a correctional system.52  
We are allowing our courts to divorce reason and deep introspection in favor of the 
mistress of judicial economy and expediency. 
At some point we will be forced from the comfort of these fictions.  The jails 
and prisons will be full, and the consequences of fatherless and motherless, mostly 
inner-city, communities will flood main street life.  But I guess that is a challenge 
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